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INFORMED CONSENT IN OBSTETRICS: SOME 

SPECIAL PROBLEMS 
NANCY K. RHODEN· 
INTRODUCTION 
As Professor Katz's astute analysis has shown us, the real world 
of medical decisionmaking bears little resemblance to lofty judicial 
language about informed consent. l Medical authority, professional so­
cialization, doctors' intense yet often unrecognized psychological 
motivations, and even judges' implicit acceptance of the belief that 
"doctor knows best," are some of the invisible yet virtually invincible 
barriers to truly shared decisionmaking. In analyzing the consent pro­
cess for the first heart transplant, Professor Katz also illustrates why 
certain areas of medicine, such as catastrophic illness, may raise par­
ticular difficulties in achieving informed consent. In this essay I will 
suggest that obstetrics is another area in which the consent process is 
peculiarly problematic. 
For the last year, I have had the opportunity to observe decision­
making in obstetrics at several hospitals. My primary interest has 
been maternal-fetal conflicts--cases where, for example, a Cesarean is 
necessary for the fetus' life or health but the woman refuses surgery, 
often on religious grounds. Increasingly, these extreme conflicts are 
resolved by courts, rather than by patients or physicians. But in the 
course of observing obstetrical decisionmaking, I have noticed dis­
turbing patterns in some of the far more common cases where there is 
little or no apparent conflict. The problems here are subtler, I believe, 
but no less real. The problems stem in part from physicians' tradi­
tional and strongly ingrained responses to situations of uncertainty. 
Part I of this article describes two paradigmatic decision strate­
gies in obstetrics, one which permeates routine obstetrical care, the 
• Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University, College of Law; B.A., Oberlin 
College, 1974; J.D., New York University, 1977. I wish to thank John Arras, Alan Fleisch­
man, Jay Katz, and Ruth Macklin for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
This research was made possible by the hospitality of Dr. Fleischman and the Albert Ein­
stein College of Medicine and by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities 
and the National Science Foundation. 
\. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984). 
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other which comes into play only when an obstetrical tragedy is in the 
making. The problem is not that these strategies exist, but that physi­
cians' typical approach to uncertainty or to a crisis may be perceived 
not as one strategy among several, but as the only legitimate approach. 
Patients see the physician's recommendation as the best or only hope 
for the baby, and this viewpoint virtually guarantees acceptance of 
that recommendation, except in cases of exceedingly firm beliefs on 
the part of the mother. 
Part II demonstrates how the almost inevitable nature of consent 
in obstetrics may mask a number of controversial value judgments re­
garding the relative importance of the woman's concerns versus the 
fetus' well-being. Such judgments are inevitable given the nature of 
obstetrics, where one patient resides silent and hidden within another. 
But the potential for conflict about judgments is intensifying as bur­
geoning technology lets doctors visualize and assess the once inaccessi­
ble fetus. As cases in which courts have ordered women to submit to 
Cesareans illustrate, in obstetrics, unlike other areas of medicine, there 
is increasing conflict over whether a competent patient should have 
the right to refuse needed medical procedures. 
In Part III, I ask how this incipient reallocation of power from 
patient to physician may affect obstetrical decisionmaking. Although 
I suggest how Professor Katz's theories could potentially improve ob­
stetrical decisionmaking, my sense is nonetheless that the prognosis 
for shared decisionmaking in obstetrics is grim. 
I. Two OBSTETRICAL PARADIGMS 
Obstetrical decisionmaking is, of course, often quite complex. At 
the risk of serious oversimplification, I will describe two prototypical 
decision strategies in obstetrics. The first is the standard American 
approach to routine obstetrical care. This is to focus on the worst 
possible outcome-fetal mortality or morbidity-and take aggressive 
preventive measures, even though the outcome is rather unlikely and 
the preventive measures have certain drawbacks of their own. This 
strategy is called the "maximin" strategy in obstetrics.2 Certain re­
sults of this strategy, i.e., the "over-medicalization" of childbirth and 
the use of arguably unnecessary interventions, have been the impetus 
for the "natural childbirth" critique of modern American obstetrics.3 
2. Brody & Thompson, The Maximin Strategy in Obstetrics, 12 J. FAM. PRAC. 977 
(1981). 
3. For a sampling of the large and growing body of literature criticizing the medical 
interventionism prevalent in American obstetrics, see Y. BRACKBILL, J. RICE & D. 
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The second approach has received far less attention because it is 
generally limited to crisis situations. It is simply the quite understand­
able tendency to intervene aggressively in any crisis where the fetus is 
imperiled, even though the chances of success, in terms of the infant's 
intact survival, are exceedingly low. The intervention here, normally a 
Cesarean, is sometimes troubling, not in the course that is chosen, but 
because of how that course is chosen. 
I should emphasize that the intent of this article is not to criticize 
either the maximin strategy or what might be called the "only hope" 
approach. Many, perhaps even most, women would choose these 
strategies if given a choice. Rather, my criticism is that women are 
not given the choice, because doctors' responses to situations of uncer­
tainty or crisis in obstetrics are so deeply ingrained, so multiply moti­
vated, and so persuasive to pregnant women that for most women, 
rejecting medical recommendations is virtually unthinkable. 
A. The Maximin Strategy in Obstetrics 
Uncertainty permeates modern medicine. If doctors waited for 
certainty to act, they might never do anything at all. But acting under 
uncertainty requires some sort of strategy for making decisions with­
out all the desirable information. Such strategies, whether conscious 
or unconscious, explicit or implicit, incorporate an attitude toward 
risk. Attitudes toward risk may vary widely, from, for example, the 
risk-averse fellow who carries an umbrella every day of the year to his 
devil-may-care counterpart who carries one only when he sees that it is 
pouring. The latter type person is unlikely to make a good doctor: 
after all, who wants a doctor who cavalierly foregoes performing tests 
for serious disease on the optimistic assumption that your strange 
symptoms will go away. 
Physicians in general come much closer to carrying umbrellas 
every day. This is quite understandable. The maximin strategy, a 
common, albeit often unarticulated medical strategy, has been de­
scribed as follows: "choosing the alternative that makes the best of the 
worst possible outcome, regardless of the probability that that out-
YOUNG, BIRTHTRAP: THE LEGAL Low-DOWN ON HIGH-TECH OBSTETRICS (1984); G. 
CASSIDy-BRINN, F. HORNSTEIN & C. DOWNER, WOMEN-CENTERED PREGNANCY AND 
BIRTH (1984); M. EDWARDS & M. WALDORF, RECLAIMING BIRTH: HISTORY AND HER­
OINES OF AMERICAN CHILDBIRTH REFORM (1984); B. ROTHMAN, GIVING BIRTH: AL­
TERNATIVES IN CHILDBIRTH (1982); THE BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BOOK 
COLLECTIVE, THE NEW OUR BODIES, OURSELVES (\984); CHILDBIRTH: ALTERNATIVES 
TO MEDICAL CONTROL (S. Romalis ed. 1981); Corea, The Cesarean Epidemic, MOTHER 
JONES, July 1980, at 28. 
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come will occur."4 This conservative, risk averse approach is most ap­
propriate when the level of uncertainty is high and the worst potential 
outcome extremely bad. This is often the situation in medicine, and 
certainly is a feature of obstetrical decisionmaking, where the fetus' 
status cannot be assessed by normal means given its internal location, 
where unexpected disasters can occur throughout pregnancy and de­
livery, and where the worst possible outcomes-maternal or neonatal 
death-are very bad indeed. Hence obstetricians typically take a vari­
ety of preventive actions intended to forestall and/or detect potential 
problems. 
Numerous examples of these preventive actions are available. The 
supine position most women are placed in in hospital deliveries facili­
tates vaginal examinations, allows episiotomy (a surgical cutting of the 
skin around the perineum to increase the opening for birth),5 and al­
lows for electronic fetal monitoring to assess the fetus' response to la­
bor. Amniotomy (rupturing the membranes) helps speed labor, a 
result considered valuable inasmuch as a very slow labor is believed to 
be more hazardous for the fetus. 6 Amniotomy is also necessary for 
internal fetal monitoring. Instructing the woman in labor not to eat or 
drink, and instead giving her fluids intravenously, is done in case an 
emergency Cesarean and general anesthesia are needed. Using elec­
tronic fetal monitoring on all women in labor is yet another example 
of maximin reasoning. While the value of fetal monitoring is unques­
tioned in high risk deliveries, fetal distress is not very common in low 
risk pregnancies: one study has calculated that in these cases, moni­
toring could at best save 3 out of 1000 babies.7 
Although each of these preventive actions may be justified, critics 
charge that interventions taken to forestall and/or detect problems 
have significant and detrimental effects of their own. Specifically, they 
claim that many such interventions interfere in the delivery process in 
a way that increases the chances of difficulties and hence make subse­
quent, and more far-reaching, interventions more likely. Again, there 
are multiple examples. At the most basic level, critics allege that the 
supine position itself slows labor and renders delivery more difficult: 
4. Brody & Thompson, supra note 2, at 977. 
5. After birth, the episiotomy must be sutured. Y. BRACKBILL, J. RICE & D. 
YOUNG, supra note 3, at 14. 
6. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH: RE­
PORT OF A CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE 342 (1981) [hereinafter CESAREAN 
CHILDBIRTH] (describing correlation between protracted labor and increased perinatal 
mortality and morbidity). 
7. Neutra, Rienberg & Griedman, The Effect 0/Fetal Monitoring on Neonatal Death 
Rates, 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 325 (1978). 
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as one doctor has put it, "Except for being hanged by the feet, the 
supine position is the worst conceivable position for labor and deliv­
ery."8 Its also been suggested that the supine position renders tears 
more likely, thus making preventive episiotomy more necessary.9 
Amniotomy, although again not a particularly significant or risky in­
tervention, does increase the risk of infection as labor continues. JO Be­
cause of this risk, women may not be allowed to labor as long with 
ruptured membranes as without. I I If labor appears slow, doctors may 
administer oxytocin to speed it up. Oxytocin, however, can cause un­
usually intense contractions that reduce fetal oxygen supply and cause 
fetal distress. 12 Oxytocin administration therefore necessitates elec­
tronic monitoring. But because oxytocin causes fetal distress in some 
cases, this series of interventions can itself lead to a Cesarean. Alter­
natively, if oxytocin is stopped in an attempt to alleviate the oxytocin­
induced distress, labor may stop as well, again necessitating surgical 
delivery. 
Finally, routine use of electronic monitoring entails a high 
number of false positives-cases in which an abnormal or seemingly 
abnormal fetal heart rate pattern is not predictive, in actuality, of fetal 
distress. Even with additional tests to try to rule out false positives, 
researchers estimate that false positive rates approach forty-four per­
cent. 13 Doctors may differ significantly in their interpretations of fetal 
heart rate patterns and their responses to potentially ominous pat­
terns.14 But the caution instilled by obstetrical training, the prevailing 
maximin strategy, and the fear of legal liability for a bad outcome 
make the response of performing a Cesarean for even a questionable 
pattern very appealing. Thus monitoring is another intervention that 
8. Y. BRACKBILL, 1. RICE & D. YOUNG, supra note 3, at 12. 
9. Id. at 13. 
10. G. CASSIDy-BRINN, F. HORNSTEIN & C. DOWNER, supra note 3, at 139; Brody 
& Thompson, supra note 2, at 980. It is often argued that the cause of the increased infec­
tion risk is the frequent vaginal exams conducted in hospitals, and that without exams labor 
could continue much longer after rupture o(meinbranes. See Corea, supra note 3, at 30. 
II. G. CASSIDy-BRINN, F. HORNSTEIN & C. DOWNER, supra note 3, at 139. 
12. Y. BRACKBILL, 1. RICE & D. YOUNG, supra note 3, at 9. In fact, one national 
expert on fetal monitoring has stated: that the most frequent cause of late decelerations in 
term labors in the United States must be hypercontractility triggered by the misuses of 
oxytocic substances. L. CIBILS, ELECTRONIC FETAL-MATERNAL MONITORING: 
ANTEPARTUM, INTRAPARTUM 229-36 (1981). 
13. Banta & Thacker, Assessing the Costs and Benefits ofElectronic Fetal Monitoring, 
34 OBSTET. & GYNECOL. SURV. 627, 629 (1979). 
14. Cohen, Klapholz & Thomas, Electronic Fetal Monitoring and Clinical Practices, 
2 MED. DECISION MAKING 79, 84 (1982) (describing variation in experts' interpretations 
of abnormal monitor patterns and recommendations for action). 
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may increase the chances of Cesarean delivery-the last link in the 
obstetrical intervention chain. 
The maximin strategy is a perfectly legitimate strategy for choice 
under uncertainty. It is intended to optimize fetal outcome, and many 
pregnant women would choose this approach over all others were al­
ternative decision strategies offered to them. The problem in obstetri­
cal decisionmaking is that they are not. Instead, the maximin strategy 
is almost synonymous with standard and accepted obstetrical practice. 
Of course, well-educated women with financial means can seek out 
private physicians who are less interventionist than others, or they can 
go to alternative birthing centers. But the general obstetrical popula­
tion is seldom presented with a choice of approaches to obstetrical 
care. 
Professor Katz describes how doctors are loathe to reveal their 
uncertainty to patients even when they are fully aware of such uncer­
tainty. Needless to say, doctors are unlikely to tell obstetrical patients 
that: (a) they are acting with uncertainty; (b) there are multiple deci­
sion strategies under uncertainty, ranging from high risk averse ones 
to less risk averse ones; (c) they, as obstetricians, prefer a strategy that 
focuses on fetal risk and takes aggressive action to prevent it; and/or 
(d) this strategy tends to increase maternal risk by increasing the 
chances of surgical delivery. It is almost impossible to imagine this 
sort of physician/patient dialogue. Indeed, the maximin strategy is so 
much a part of the obstetrical profession's "collective unconscious" 
that the doctor is as unlikely to describe this as one strategy among 
many as the trial lawyer who long since accepted the adversarial sys­
tem as the best and only system of justice is to question the system's 
real value. 
B. The Only Hope Approach 
The second strategy applies only when the fetus is in great peril. 
Much as doctors using the maximin strategy basically discount the 
probability of the bad outcome materializing, physicians faced with an 
obstetrical crisis tend to intervene aggressively to give the baby its last 
or only hope, even in cases where the chances of success are extremely 
low. I have participated in retroactive discussions of a number of 
cases where the issue was whether doctors should have recommended, 
as they always did, and even urged Cesarean delivery given the fetus' 
slim chances of intact survival. I will first describe the most common 
situation where this obstetrical strategy comes into play, and then sev­
eral variations based on cases or composites of cases that I have seen. 
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The issue of Cesarean delivery arises when a woman comes to the 
hospital in premature labor that cannot be stopped, or when she has a 
medical condition in late pregnancy that necessitates premature deliv­
ery. Premature fetuses may be endangered by the labor process, and 
may do better if delivered surgically.ls When harm from vaginal de­
livery is feared, and the baby is very likely to survive intact if delivered 
by Cesarean-i.e., the pregnancy has progressed beyond the twenty­
eighth week and there are no complicating factors, then recom­
mending Cesarean delivery to give the baby its best chance is fairly 
uncontroversial. But as gestation length decreases, a dilemma arises. 
Babies born after twenty-four weeks of gestation are at the thresh­
old of viability. 16 A few infants born this early will thrive. Others will 
survive, but with lingering neurological deficits. Many more will die, 
though perhaps after harrowing weeks or months in the neonatal in­
tensive care unit. Chances of survival, and of intact survival, increase 
with every week of gestation from weeks twenty-four to twenty-eight, 
after which time about eighty percent of infants survive. 17 There is, 
however, no question that an infant born even at week twenty-eight 
will require months in the intensive care unit, and will face an in­
creased risk of death or disability. Thus these cases entail radical un­
certainty about the baby's prospects, but certainty as to the need for 
lengthy, intensive care. 
Compounding this is the fact that while Cesarean section is at any 
time a more hazardous mode of delivery for the woman than vaginal 
delivery,18 early in pregnancy it is more hazardous still. Because of 
the underdevelopment of the lower segment of the uterus until some­
time after about the thirtieth week, an early Cesarean cannot be the 
standard low transverse kind, but must be a classical vertical inci­
sion. 19 This is a more serious operation, and one that definitely ren­
ders Cesarean delivery necessary for any subsequent births.20 Thus 
15. In general, the more immature the fetus, the greater the risks from labor and 
delivery. J. PRITCHARD, P. MACDONALD & N. GANT, WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 756 (17th 
ed. 1985). 
16. See id. at 143 (fetuses born at 24th week almost always die shortly after birth). 
17. See P. BUDETII, P. McMANUS, N. BARRAND & L. HEINER, THE IMPLICA­
TIONS OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: THE COST AND 
EFFECTIVENESS OF NEONATAL INTENSIVE CARE 32 (1981) (greater than 80% survival 
rate for infants between 1000 grams, the mean weight at 28 weeks, and 1500 grams). 
18. Figures vary, but a general estimate is that Cesarean birth carries 2-4 times the 
risk of mortality as vaginal birth. CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH, supra note 6, at 16. 
19. Interview with Dr. Joanna Shulman, Assistant Professor of Obstetrics and Gyne­
cology, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, in New York City (Jan. 24, 1986) [hereinafter 
Shulman interview]. 
20. Id. 
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another feature of these cases is increased maternal risk. In this in­
stance, the decision to be made is whether the infant's chances of in­
tact survival warrant this increased maternal risk. 
Women faced with these dilemmas most often desperately want a 
child. Hence, even if the chances for intact survival are slim, they can 
be readily persuaded to go for the long shot. In some cases, it may be 
highly questionable whether the infant's chances really warrant ag­
gressive intervention. But even in these cases, it is extremely hard for 
physicians to stand by and not perform surgery if there is any hope at 
all, even the slimmest thread. 
A case in which a woman came to the hospital in her thirty-first 
week reporting no fetal movement for two to three days illustrated this 
latter reality. Ultrasound examination showed quite significant 
growth retardation in the fetus, with its size appearing to be consistent 
with twenty-seven to twenty-eight weeks gestation. Because of the in­
trauterine growth retardation, her fetus' chances were not nearly as 
good as the chances of a fetus at thirty-one weeks with normal size for 
its gestation age. Moreover, two days of no discernible fetal movement 
were ominous signs, and electronic fetal monitoring confirmed that the 
fetus was in extreme distress. In fact, physicians classified the fetus' 
heart pattern as "early terminal," indicating a strong probability of 
either early death or severe retardation if it survived. 
The woman was not in labor, and fetal death was virtually inevi­
table absent Cesarean delivery. She initially stated that she did not 
want a Cesarean, which would have to be a classical one, because she 
did not want to have a retarded child. Although physician opinion 
was mixed, one of the doctors convinced the woman to have surgery, 
stressing that it was her baby's only hope, and at one point implying 
that with surgery her baby's chances were perhaps fifty percent. The 
Cesarean was performed, and the baby was born weighing 735 grams. 
For its gestational age, it should have weighed 1,000 to 1,400 grams. 
The baby lived approximately forty~~ight hours. In subsequent discus­
sions, various medical personnel questioned the influence exerted on 
the woman and suggested that although it was very hard to estimate 
the infant's chances of intact survival with all of its risk factors, they 
were nowhere near fifty percent. Several female physicians and mid­
wives stated that they would not have wanted a Cesarean under those 
circumstances. 
In that case, the woman involved expressed an opinion even 
though she was talked into having surgery anyway. Often, however, a 
woman may have no opportunity to say anything at all. For example, 
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in another case, a pregnant woman came in at term reporting several 
days of no fetal movement. Doctors initially tried to induce labor by 
giving her pitocin. Electronic fetal monitoring, however, showed fetal 
distress. A fetal scalp blood sampling indicated a pH of 7.02. A nor­
mal pH level is between 7.2 and 7.25 while a pH of 7.02 shows severe 
anoxia and one below 7.0, if sustained for long, is consistent with cel­
lular death.21 A second fetal scalp blood sample was done to confirm 
the severity of the fetus' condition and it showed a pH of 6.8-a level 
that is basically incompatible with life. At this point, the fetal heart 
tracing was terminal. Doctors then told the woman that the only hope 
for her baby's survival was an emergency Cesarean. They did not 
present her with a choice about surgery, nor did they tell her how 
unlikely intact survival was no matter what they did. The doctors per­
formed the Cesarean, and the baby lived about fifteen hours. 
Subsequent rounds again questioned the advisability of perform­
ing a Cesarean in this case, or at least of performing it without explain­
ing to the woman just how grave the situation was, despite the 
obviously extreme time constraints. One of the obstetrical experts said 
that with a pH of 6.8 only ten percent of babies will survive, with 
about fifty percent of the survivors being normal. Of course, a 
Cesarean would be perfectly appropriate if an informed mother wished 
it, but this woman had no chance to make an informed decision.22 
The problem that these cases illustrate relates neither to actual 
outcome, nor to the choice to intervene aggressively. Rather, the prob­
lem is the near inevitability of this choice and the reasons that underlie 
it. Most women would probably choose aggressive intervention when 
there is any hope at all, and one certainly does not want doctors to 
readily "write-off" imperiled fetuses. As with catastrophic illnesses, 
when an extraordinary or even experimental treatment may be the 
only hope, doctors' strong personal and professional inclination in ob­
stetrical crises is to seize that slim chance. But at some point, as the 
baby's chances decrease, intervention begins to seem less like a realis­
tic effort to save and becomes more of a rescue fantasy, or an attempt 
to vanquish the doctor's feelings of helplessness and fulfill a deeply 
ingrained personal and professional need to do something. Doctors' 
21. Physicians provided these figures in discussion of the cases, and the severity of 
the pH level is confirmed by discussions in various texts. See, e.g., Haverkamp, A Con­
trolled Trial of the Differential Effects of Intrapartum Fetal Monitoring, 134 AM. J. OB­
STET. GYNECOL. 399,401 (1979) (pH of 7.20-7.25 problematic; below 7.20 an indication 
for immediate action). 
22. I should emphasize that cases such as these are standard: the only unusual fea­
ture may be the subsequent ethical analysis. 
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inclinations here may color how they present the chances to the wo­
man. Moreover, even if they fully inform her of her baby's grim pros­
pects, it is still true that surgery is the child's only chance, and that in 
some cases, if the baby lives despite foregoing surgery, it could be 
worse off than if the Cesarean had been performed. Some women may 
nonetheless prefer almost inevitable fetal death to a strong possibility 
that the baby will live but with severe retardation. Yet they may feel 
enormous guilt at even thinking this, much less expressing it to a doc­
tor who appears unreceptive. Doctors need only to suggest, "Don't 
you want to do everything for your baby?" for the woman's questions 
about surgery, prognosis, etc., to be submerged into the drive to give 
her child its only chance for life. 23 
Thus we have two prevalent, but largely implicit and unques­
tioned, approaches to decisionmaking in obstetrics. Women are often 
told nothing more than that a particular procedure is necessary for 
their baby's health. Given the circumstances, it is no wonder that the 
recommended procedure is almost always performed. Indeed, perhaps 
what is surprising is that some women steadfastly refuse recommended 
interventions. In the typical case where the woman consents, whether 
readily, desperately, or reluctantly, a set of value judgments are often 
obscured in the process. It is therefore worthwhile spelling out the 
various value judgments implicit in both routine and crisis-oriented 
obstetrical decisions, as well as briefly describing the emerging conflict 
over who decides. 
II. OBSTETRICAL VALVES AND OBSTETRICAL RESPONSIBILITY 
It is quite obvious that decisionmaking in obstetrics differs from 
decisionmaking in other areas of medicine, in that only in obstetrics is 
one patient within and dependent upon another. It has not been until 
recent years, with the development of new techniques allowing the 
doctor to visualize and assess the fetus' status, and the possibility of 
taking various actions (e.g., monitoring, surgical delivery) solely for 
the fetus' benefit, that the full implications of this dual patienthood 
have started to emerge.24 In the past, because nothing much could be 
23. Dr. Joanna Shulman, among others, has emphasized doctors' enormous influ­
ence, particularly when recommendations for intervention are expressed in this way. Shul­
man interview, supra note 19. 
24. There is a burgeoning literature on these potential conflicts, much of it analyzing 
the potential impact of in utero fetal therapy. See, e.g., Barclay, McCormick, Sidbury, 
Michejda & Hodgen, The Ethics ofIn Utero Surgery, 246 J. A.M.A. 1550 (1981); Fletcher, 
Healing before Birth: An Ethical Dilemma, TECH. REV., Jan. 1984, at 27; Hubbard, Legal 
and Policy Implications of Recent Advances in Prenatal Diagnosis and Fetal Therapy, 7 
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done for the invisible and inaccessible fetus, the woman was, by de­
fault, the primary focus of the physician treating the maternal/fetal 
unit. Today, however, there is more of a gestalt at work in whether 
one sees the woman as primary, or the fetus, or each at different times. 
Electronic fetal monitoring, for example, makes the fetus the focus of 
the delivery process: a common complaint is that the blips on the 
monitor screen tend to displace attention from the laboring woman. 
In a very real sense, the woman is a barrier which must be overcome in 
order to assess fetal status. As technology improves medicine's ability 
to "penetrate" this "maternal barrier," the possibility for value con­
flicts in obstetrics concomitantly increases. 
One potential value conflict that may permeate routine obstetrical 
decision making arises from the juxtaposition of the medical maximin 
strategy, which emphasizes fetal outcome, and an individual woman's 
views about the importance of the birthing process. While many wo­
men may share a desire to avoid any fetal risks at all costs, others may 
reject much medical intervention because of religious views, desires for 
a natural childbirth, or other reasons. Pregnant women, as the ones 
who experience the process of pregnancy and childbirth, naturally 
have a greater interest and concern about the process itself. Some doc­
tors scoff at concerns about process. One researcher on the increasing 
Cesarean rate reports repeatedly being asked by physicians: "'What's 
so great about delivering from below [vaginally] anyway?' "25 Others 
may recognize the legitimacy of these concerns, and be willing to let 
them influence their mode of practice, but because it is the patient's 
birth process, not the physician's, the obstetrician can never actually 
share the concerns. 
It is, of course, a truism that no doctor can fully embrace and 
accept a patient's feelings-the fundamental isolation of an individual 
in one's own SUbjectivity is inescapable. But the barriers to achieving 
at least empathy are higher than usual in obstetrics, because of the 
different ways to perceive the maternal/fetal unit. The maximin strat­
egy, by focusing on the fetus, inclines its adherents to see the fetus as 
figure and the woman as ground, at least metaphorically. Thus the 
doctor might view the woman's concerns about process as trivial or 
frivolous in comparison to the overriding goal of achieving optimal 
fetal outcome, and the woman who senses this may find it harder to 
express her concerns. 
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 201 (1982); Ruddick & Wilcox, Operating on the Fetus, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP., Oct. 1982, at 10. 
25. Corea, supra note 3, at 31 (quoting Dr. Helen Marieskind). 
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The potential conflict between a physician's focus on fetal out­
come and some women's concerns about the birthing process will be 
intensified in the cases in which the woman believes outcome and pro­
cess are not entirely separate. Doctors using a maximin strategy make 
a strong dichotomy between process and outcome. A woman, how­
ever, may believe that her baby will do better if she does not take 
drugs, or walks around during labor (and thus is not continuously 
monitored), or even if she gives birth in a more relaxed and intimate 
home environment. Whether or not process ordinarily affects out­
come, it will be at least somewhat more likely to do so if the woman 
strongly believes it will: for example, monitoring can slow labor or 
even cause decreased oxygen flow to the fetus if the woman exper­
iences a great deal of anxiety about the monitor.26 Because virtually 
all maximin-type interventions are aimed at optimizing fetal outcome, 
doctors may have good scientific reason to reject a woman's idea that a 
more natural process will enhance outcome. But this may give too 
little importance to the SUbjective force of the woman's beliefs. 
Of course, the woman also is concerned about her outcome. Her 
concern may encompass not only objectively devastating outcomes 
such as death, disability, or loss of reproductive capacity, but also feel­
ings about pain, bodily invasion, recovery time from giving birth 
(which is greater with surgical than vaginal delivery), future Cesare­
ans, and scarring. These concerns are similar to those of any medical 
patient and again, while doctors can try to understand, they cannot 
really know or adopt the patient's values. Here, however, her values 
potentially can harm the fetus, at least if she strongly opposes medical 
or surgical intervention. Thus the physician may be more apt to dis­
count them or deem them illegitimate. 
The potential conflicts discussed thus far have involved the max­
imin strategy's focus on the fetus versus the woman's incorporation of 
concerns for her health, her religious beliefs, or her views about the 
birthing process. Routine obstetrical decisions, while they often in­
volve trading off some increased degree of fetal safety for maternal 
comfort, seldom involve extreme threats to the fetus that involve value 
judgments about the possible quality of its life. Judgments in crisis 
situations, however, do. Although in the two specific examples dis­
cussed under the "only hope" strategy the baby died anyway, acts of 
last-ditch intervention often mean the difference between life and 
death. But often the life that is saved is not a normal life. These cases, 
therefore, involve a value judgment directed solely at the fetus: does 
26. Cibils, supra note 12, at 478. 
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the woman want her child to survive at all costs, or would she con­
sider some types of existence as either worse than death, or at any rate, 
a burden she does not wish to accept? Like the woman in our first 
example, who initially said no to a Cesarean because she did not want 
a retarded child, some women may rank severe disability in a child as 
worse than death. These women would choose not to intervene ag­
gressively if the situation was extremely grave. 
Conflicts can arise, of course, if the doctor treating the patient 
ranks death worse than disability, or worse than this infant's projected 
disability. However, conflicts can arise even if the doctor and the wo­
man share similar values. A number of factors appear to influence 
doctors to act as if they ranked death as necessarily the worst out­
come. For example, quite understandably, they are influenced by the 
almost inevitable uncertainty in these cases: there is usually some 
chance, albeit slim, that the baby will be fine, or at least do better than 
expected, and it is very hard not to intervene when this possibility still 
exists. As in cases of terminal illness, allowing the death of a patient 
may feel to the doctor like giving up, and in obstetrics, it may feel like 
giving up unnecessarily. They are likewise influenced to intervene by 
the presence of technology: it is difficult not to use technology when it 
is there, especially given medical training and socialization in favor of 
intervention. The legal system magnifies the force of this imperative: 
if the infant is impaired and the doctor has just stood by, the doctor 
may face legal liability, whereas if he has done a Cesarean, the doctor 
has the strong defense of having done everything. 27 
An additional legal factor is beginning to make itself felt, in the 
wake of the now infamous "Baby Doe" case, where parents of a baby 
born with Down's Syndrome and a correctable esophageal defect re­
fused consent to esophageal surgery. When the state courts refused to 
intervene, the Department of Health and Human Services promul­
gated regulations designed to prohibit withholding of treatment from 
handicapped newboms.28 The principle underlying the regulations­
27. See Marieskind, Cesarean Section, 7 WOMEN & HEALTH 179, 188 (1982) (fear of 
legal liability often plays role in decision to deliver by Cesarean). 
28. The Department initially "reminded" health care providers receiving federal fi­
nancial assistance that newborns with handicaps were protected by § 504 of the Rehabilita­
tion Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982), which prohibits discrimination against the 
handicapped by any program or provider receiving federal financial assistance. 47 Fed. 
Reg. 26,027 (1982). This notice was followed, a year later, by an "Interim Final Rule" 
which not only prohibited such "discrimination" but required each hospital to post a sign 
in the newborn nursery stating that it is unlawful to fail to provide food or treatment to 
handicapped newborns and advising of the availability of a "hotline" to report violations. 
48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983). After this regulation was invalidated on the grounds that the 
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that it is discriminatory to withhold beneficial treatment from a handi­
capped infant if such treatment would be provided to a normal one­
appeared to apply not only to handicaps such as Down's Syndrome, 
but to far more devastating ones, which dramatically shortened life 
and/or resulted in profound physical and mental deficits.29 The regu­
lations were invalidated on a number of grounds by a series of federal 
courts,30 culminating with the Supreme Court decision in Bowen v. 
American Hospital Association,31 which emphasized that hospitals 
have no duty, and indeed, no right, to treat infants without parental 
consent. The Court found that the Department presented insufficient 
evidence of hospitals failing to report parental refusals of treatment for 
handicapped newborns to warrant the regulations.32 Thus far, the end 
Department had failed to follow the notice and comment procedures required by the Ad­
ministrative Procedure Act, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 
404 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the Department then followed proper procedures, issuing a Final 
Rule, 49 Fed. Reg. 1621 (1984), which modified the requirements for posting of signs, and 
used slightly more moderate language. The rule still provided that it was discrimination to 
fail to treat any newborn who could benefit from treatment, no matter how severe the 
degree of handicap. 
29. For critiques of the application of the principle of nondiscrimination in the new­
born nursery, see, e.g., Arras, Ethical Principles for the Care of Imperiled Newborns: To­
ward an Ethic ofAmbiguity, in WHICH BABIES SHALL LIVE: HUMANISTIC DIMENSIONS 
OF THE CARE OF IMPERILED NEWBORNS 83, 100-05 (T. Murray & A. Caplan, eds. 1985) 
(analyzing various interpretations of "discrimination" in the context of treatment deci­
sions); Rhoden, Treatment Dilemmas for Imperiled Newborns: Why Quality ofLife Counts, 
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1298-1302 (1985); Rhoden & Arras, Withholding Treatmentfrom 
Baby Doe: From Discrimination to Child Abuse, 63 MILBANK MEM. FUND. Q. 18, 24-29 
(1985). 
30. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 161 (2d Cir. 1984) (invalidating 
regulations on primary ground that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was never intended to 
apply to complex treatment decisions in the newborn nursery), aff'g 575 F. Supp. 607, 614 
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (denying government access to records of "Baby Jane Doe," an infant 
with spina bifid a upon whom surgery had not been performed, on the grounds that the 
hospital had not violated the Rehabilitation Act). 
31. 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986). Lower court decisions in the American Hospital litigation 
had been expressly based upon the Second Circuit's holding in University Hosp., 729 F.2d 
144. See, American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D. N.Y. 1984), aff'd Nos. 
84-6211 and 84-6231 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 1984). 
32. Bowen, 106 S. Ct. at 2114-20. It is true, and quite important, that hospitals can­
not treat a baby without parental consent. However, the Supreme Court majority's empha­
sis on the theory that hospitals cannot violate Section 504 by withholding treatment when 
parents have refused consent distorts the way that treatment decisions are made in hospi­
tals. As the dissent notes, parental decisions do not occur in a vacuum, but are made in 
conjunction with physicians. Physicians may treat handicapped newborns differently from 
non-handicapped ones by encouraging, or not discouraging, parental inclinations to with­
hold treatment. Id. at 2128, (White, J., dissenting). As for the majority holding that there 
is no evidence that hospitals discriminatorily fail to report non-treatment decisions for 
handicapped newborns, anyone who has talked with physicians about these issues knows 
that, as the dissent puts it: "It is ... obvious that whoever is making them, decisions to 
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result of the public attention given to the dilemma of treatment of 
imperiled newborns is the invalidation of the very rigid Baby Doe reg­
ulations. In the interim, however, Congress passed the 1984 Amend­
ments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act33 which 
mandate treatment unless the infant is dying, permanently comatose, 
or the treatment is futile or virtually futile and under the circum­
stances inhumane. 34 Although these Amendments are more flexible 
than the former Baby Doe regulations, they still indicate a strong in­
tent to decrease parental and physician discretion and require aggres­
sive treatment if the infant will have even a very minimal level of 
consciousness. 
Given these various developments, it is not at all surprising that 
even though many physicians may believe that withholding or termi­
nating treatment for seriously impaired infants is appropriate in cer­
tain cases, they increasingly feel constrained to treat all infants 
aggressively. Moreover, as parental discretion immediately after birth 
is increasingly limited, doctors may wonder whether a woman should 
be able to opt for death over disability in the moments before birth, as 
well as whether the doctor might risk legal liability if he accedes to 
such wishes. Thus even if doctors have values similar to those of their 
obstetric patients, and even if doctors, were they personally faced with 
such a situation, might forego aggressive treatment, their professional 
training, fears of malpractice liability, concerns created by the "Baby 
Doe" rules, etc., may come between their beliefs and actions. 
My experience at hospitals suggests that a physician is relatively 
unlikely to go to court to attempt to force treatment in a crisis situa­
tion where the fetus' chances, even with treatment, appear seriously 
compromised. For one thing, if it is a crisis situation where "last 
ditch" intervention is being urged, the woman probably lacks firm reli­
gious or philosophical objections to such intervention-as opposed to 
a situation where a woman had informed health care personnel from 
the beginning that she would oppose certain procedures. Rather, she 
is just trying, like the doctors, to weigh the risks of intervention-both 
the risk to her and the chance of a severely impaired child-versus the 
withhold treatment from such infants are in fact being made." Id. I believe that the regu­
lations warranted invalidation on a number of grounds, including excessive interference 
with parental and medical discretion, the fact that the Rehabilitation Act was never in­
tended to apply to such situations, and that the principle of nondiscrimination is grossly 
oversimplified for these difficult decisions in the newborn nursery. My quarrel with the 
majority opinion in Bowen is not about its outcome, but its misrepresentation of the medi­
cal context in an attempt to rationalize the outcome. 
33. 42 U.S.c. §§ 5101-5115 (Supp. III 1985). 
34. 42 U.S.c. § 5102(2)(b)(3) (Supp. III 1985). 
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potential benefits of saving a child who turns out to be fine, or at least 
relatively normal. When the physician is offering even a slim chance 
of saving the infant, it is likely that the combination of uncertainty, 
guilt, hope, and desperation will influence the woman ultimately to 
follow the physician's suggestion. And, in the rare case where desper­
ate or reluctant consent is not forthcoming, doctors would be rela­
tively unlikely to seek a court order, both because of the time 
constraints and because they are less likely to challenge the woman's 
decision if they believe that even with treatment, the infant is likely to 
die or be severely impaired. If, however, doctors believe that with the 
treatment the child can be fine, they are increasingly apt to challenge 
the woman's decision in court. 
Most such suits so far have involved women's refusals to submit 
to Cesareans needed for the fetus', and sometimes their own, health. 
In the two cases reported in the legal or medical literature, the courts 
have granted the order,35 and this has similarly been true in most of 
the additional unreported cases of which I am aware.36 These cases 
are still, at present, few and far between, and they have involved, for 
the most part, women with unusual religious beliefs about medical in­
tervention. But they have an import beyond their numbers. These 
cases raise the ultimate issue in obstetrics of whether women can 
choose a course of action that reflects their own beliefs and concerns, 
but that puts the fetus at risk. This issue is not limited to Cesarean 
versus vaginal delivery: courts have ordered blood transfusions for 
pregnant Jehovah's Witnesses, both before and after fetal viability,37 
and a court has ordered insulin treatment for a pregnant diabetic who 
refused it on religious grounds. 38 These judicial interventions into wo­
35. See Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 
457 (1981); Bowes & SeJgestad, Fetal Versus Maternal Rights: Medical and Legal Perspec­
tives, 58 OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 209, 211-12 (1981). 
36. See, e.g., In re Baby Jeffries, No. 14004 (Probate Ct., Jackson Cy, Mich., May 
24, 1982) (order authorizing surgery); North Central Bronx Hosp. v. Headley, No. 1992/85 
(S. Ct., Special Term, Bronx Cy, N.Y., Jan. 6, 1986) (order authorizing surgery). Some 
cases arise and are decided so quickly that no written order is issued. Interview with Judge 
Margaret Taylor, Family Court, in New York City (Nov. 6, 1985) (describing 1982 case 
where attorneys for St. Vincent's Hospital sought an order but she refused to issue one). 
37. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 
537 (1964). This case was decided long before Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and is 
thus of somewhat questionable precedential value. A much more recent case is In re Ja­
maica Hosp., N.Y.L.J., May 17, 1985, at 15 (Queens Cy., S. Ct., Special Term, Part 2) 
(fetus was 18 weeks in gestation). 
38. In re Unborn Baby Wilson, cited in In re Baby Jeffries, No. 14004 (Probate Ct., 
Jackson Cy., Mich., May 24, 1982) slip op. at 7. Hospital personnel are increasingly begin­
ning to contemplate numerous potential involuntary treatments. I have participated in 
ethics rounds at several hospitals where the issue was whether a pregnant patient whose 
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men's choices are in striking contrast to the trend in other areas of 
medicine, which is to accept patients' rights to refuse medical treat­
ment of any kind. In obstetrics, however, doctors and others in society 
are increasingly questioning whether women have the right to take 
actions or refuse therapies which might imperil the healthy fetus. 39 
Thus far, doctors have sought judicial intervention only when 
they believed that without treatment the fetus would die or be dam­
aged, but with treatment would probably be fine. But if overriding 
women's choices becomes established judicial fare, doctors may begin 
seeking judicial intervention, or threaten to seek it, in cases where the 
infant might be compromised even with maximal treatment. This 
would, after all, make sense, if the thrust of the Child Abuse Amend­
ments-that handicapped newborns have the same rights to treatment 
as non-handicapped ones-is considered to apply in utero as well. 
The potential for reallocation of decisionmaking authority in ob­
stetrics does not stop here, either. Although cases thus far have in­
volved maternal actions that have created grave risks for their fetuses, 
many women take actions that physicians consider less than optimal 
during pregnancy. For example, many women refuse electronic fetal 
monitoring, or even choose to give birth at home. Whether or not the 
long arm of the law ever reaches women who have fled the hospital,40 
when the woman is in the hospital it is not too far-fetched to imagine 
that doctors may challenge refusals of procedures such as fetal moni­
toring.41 Concern for the fetus, as well as concern about malpractice 
liability, has inspired hospital risk managers, legal counsel and counsel 
for New York City public hospitals sometimes to advise doctors just to 
do whatever is best for the fetus, notwithstanding maternal refusa1.42 
conduct was harmful to the fetus in some way could be forcibly hospitalized and/or 
treated. 
39. In a recent article, the author describes a situation where a woman was seven 
months pregnant and at a cocktail party, when "a stranger walked over and wordlessly 
removed a glass of white wine from her hand." The author also reports being pregnant 
herself and having dinner at a Chinese restaurant when a woman she didn't know stopped 
at her table tapped her plate, and said, "Uh, uh, uh, MSG." Quindlen, The New Rules for 
Pregnancy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1986, Part II (Magazine) at 82,86. The author refers to 
these intervenors as the "fetus police." Id. 
40. In one court-ordered Cesarean case, the order authorized police to seek out the 
pregnant woman and forcibly return her to the hospital. In re Baby Jeffries, No. 14004 
(Probate Ct., Jackson Cy., Mich., May 24, 1982) slip op. at 9. 
41. The order in another case appointed the chief of obstetrics as guardian ad litem 
for the fetus, with authority to consent to necessary diagnostic or therapeutic procedures if 
the woman came to the hospital. North Central Bronx Hosp. v. Headley, No. 1992/85 (S. 
Ct., Special Term, Bronx Cy., N.Y., Jan. 6, 1986) slip op. at 2. 
42. Interview with Salvatore Russo, Associate Counsel, N.Y.C. Health & Hospitals 
Corp., in New York City (Jan. 10, 1985) (stating opinion that city hospital should be able 
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Even though this advice reflects fears of financial responsibility, it con­
stitutes an assumption of medical responsibility for fetal outcome and 
obstetrical decisionmaking. Thus along with the existing potential 
value conflicts is emerging a conflict on a higher level: to what extent 
should pregnant women have the authority and responsibility for mak­
ing the sorts of medical decisions that, under the informed consent 
doctrine, patients ordinarily, or at least theoretically, make? 
III. CAN ANYTHING BE DONE? 
Professor Katz's central thesis, of course, is that truly shared 
decisionmaking in medicine requires that physicians reflect upon and 
discuss among themselves the underlying influences on their decisions, 
including psychological motives, professional values and socialization, 
and that they enter into an open-ended dialogue with patients in which 
they share their uncertainties. By listening to patients, physicians may 
be at least partially able to overcome what Katz calls one of the most 
pernicious problems in medicine: "that in their professional interac­
tions with patients, physicians view themselves as too rational and 
their patients as too irrational" (p. 150). If physicians take the time to 
analyze their own unconscious motivations and to realize how their 
non-medical values seep into judgments they had heretofore conceptu­
alized as purely, or at least largely, medical, they will achieve an en­
hanced regard for the differing values that could underlie patients' 
inclinations to act differently. 
Obstetrical decisionmaking would undoubtedly be improved if 
physicians were, for some reason, inspired to take Professor Katz's 
suggestions seriously and to seek to implement them. Obstetricians 
are, of course, aware that diagnostic technologies in obstetrics have 
their limitations, and that they may therefore "diagnose" problems 
that do not in fact exist. But many obstetricians are not fully aware 
that they are trained to react to uncertainty in a particular manner: 
they may believe that their response is the only possible response or, 
because uncertainty makes them so uncomfortable, may fail to take it 
fully into account. Doctors feel an understandable discomfort in ad­
mitting, and especially in revealing to patients, the fact that the ma­
chines upon which they are so dependent are far from infallible. But 
to perform procedures necessary for fetus' health, despite maternal refusal, and that ob­
taining court order helpful but not necessary); Interview with Patty Lipschitz, Counsel, 
North Central Bronx Hospital, in New York City (Jan. 13, 1985) (confirming that the 
Health and Hospital Corporation does not think court orders necessary, but expressing 
disapproval of this stance). 
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doctors clearly need to tell patients, preferably early in the course of 
pregnancy and long before a crisis could arise, of the limitations of 
diagnostic technologies and of the possibility that they will need to act 
under conditions of uncertainty. 
Providing information about technological limitations and the 
possibility of unclear diagnoses or prognoses is not enough, however. 
Physicians must come to understand both why they react to diagnostic 
and prognostic uncertainty the way they do and why a patient might 
react differently. In other words, they need to go the very difficult 
extra step of recognizing that there are sometimes legitimate alterna­
tives to the approaches that have come to seem so natural and so right. 
Such awareness is difficult to attain.43 Awareness of alternative ap­
proaches to decisionmaking under uncertainty comes at a cost: in a 
field where quick, decisive action is so often needed, it is difficult to be 
quick and decisive when one's certainty is diminishing .. 
This, however, is the point at which shared decisionmaking is 
helpful. A doctor who unequivocally is not sure of the "right" way to 
proceed is far more likely to make the choice in conjunction with the 
patient, taking her values into account. In obstetrics, because there 
are situations that indeed require quick, decisive action, exploration of 
the woman's values should ideally take place long before pressured or 
emergency decisionmaking is necessary. Because in an emergency 
there is so little time for exploration of the values of doctor and pa­
tient, it is crucial that whenever possible, such conversations be held in 
advance of any emergency. If the doctor has taken the time to discuss 
the sorts of dilemmas that may arise, even though such discussions 
may be disturbing and frightening, the physician will then have a 
much better sense of the woman's own concerns and values, and con­
versations during a crisis will be more profitable. 
Few women will come for prenatal care with a rigidly established 
set of priorities to be applied to a situation in which their health inter­
ests and those of the fetus might conflict. Some observers have sug­
gested a broad spectrum of possibilities in discussing innovative fetal 
surgery-from the woman placing her health and welfare first and 
foremost, to subsuming her interests to those of the fetus, to seeking a 
reasonable center ground.44 Moreover, with any set of preferences, 
43. At the two hospitals affiliated with Albert Einstein College of Medicine at which 
Dr. Fleischman and I led Perinatal Law and Ethics Rounds, lengthy and sustained discus­
sion regarding the medical uncertainties involved seemed to help physicians feel more com­
fortable with, and less responsible for, uncertainty. 
44. Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 24, at 12-13. Ruddick and Wilcox suggest three 
possible therapeutic contracts between woman and physician: (1) gynecological-the wo­
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women will differ in whether they would rather risk fetal death-often 
by refraining from intervention-or neurological disability-some­
times by intervention when the diagnosis is ominous. 
Obviously, if the woman's preferences, values and inclinations to­
ward particular approaches to uncertainty differ radically from the 
physician's, serious problems will arise. Because of the potential conse­
quences to the fetus, obstetricians find it particularly hard to defer to 
patient's wishes. Serious conflicts unearthed early in pregnancy may 
warrant a change in physician. But public patients, or ones who come 
in later in pregnancy, may not have this lUxury. In these cases, physi­
cians face the difficult task of learning to respect and honor the wo­
man's choices even when they differ somewhat from their own, and in 
the course of doing so, treating her not simply as a patient, but as an 
equal partner in the obstetrical undertaking. They must see value con­
flicts not as a threat to their authority, but as a challenge-how to 
provide the best care possible that is nonetheless consistent with the 
woman's values. 
Of course, these suggestions do not answer the question that is 
unique to obstetrics: how to proceed in cases of irreconcilable conflict, 
when honoring the woman's choice almost surely will endanger the 
fetus. Professor Katz astutely notes the extent to which judges are 
inclined to distrust patients and uphold medical authority (p. 59). 
This inclination often will prevail in obstetric conflicts, especially 
given the dreadful and irrevocable consequences of upholding, for ex­
ample, a woman's refusal of a Cesarean which is needed for the fetus' 
life or health. A judge's tendency to grant the doctors' request, illus­
trated in almost all the cases thus far, may be reinforced by the fact 
that the women in these cases are seldom represented by counsel. But 
even though they can probably succeed, individual obstetricians and 
the obstetrical profession in general, need to seriously consider the 
prior question of whether, in the long run, it is wise to ask courts to 
replace informed consent with enforced acquiescence. 
One potential drawback of seeking judicial intervention to over­
ride treatment refusals of pregnant women relates to the informed con­
sent doctrine itself. When a woman comes in for prenatal care and 
indicates that she has unusual religious or medical beliefs that would 
cause her to oppose surgical intervention, doctors should have an obli­
gation to tell her that if a crisis arises, they will not honor these beliefs. 
man's health coming first, with pregnancy as a complication of her gynecological condition; 
(2) pediatric-the fetus treated as if it were a child, with its needs and interest paramount 
to those of the woman's; and (3) obstetric-some middle ground between (1) and (2). Id. 
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Her response may be to find another doctor, a response that is proba­
bly agreeable to all concerned. But if she is a public patient, she may 
have no alternative, and may end up foregoing prenatal care. Signifi­
cantly, in several cases where a court order has been obtained, the 
woman did not return to the hospital and in one case a very high risk 
woman had a home birth.45 If this occurs with any frequency, the 
doctors' fetal protection policy will backfire, putting the fetus at even 
greater risk than would a hospital birth where surgery is refused. 
Even if the woman bows to this powerful combination of obstetri­
cal and judicial authority, however, the obstetrical physician-patient 
relationship may suffer more subtle erosion as a result of this realloca­
tion of power. The possibility of involuntary commitment looms over 
certain psychiatrist-patient encounters and may make those en­
counters far more problematic than when such a threat is absent. Pa­
tients, whether psychiatric or obstetric, who know that their doctors 
can forcibly treat them in a way they abhor may view those doctors 
differently from patients who unambivalently believe their doctors are 
there to help them. Even though in individual cases the consequences 
of abiding by a maternal refusal will be tragic, the consequences of 
patients losing their right to choose and seeing their obstetricians as 
adversaries may be ultimately. at least as disturbing. Moreover, as 
doctors assimilate their newfound power to direct women to "follow 
doctor's orders," and increasingly view themselves in the role of fetal 
protectors or advocates, these doctors will lose whatever incentive 
they now have to share decisionmaking in any meaningful way. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, there is reason to be profoundly pessimistic about 
the chances for shared decisionmaking in obstetrics. The intense anal­
ysis and ongoing dialogue for which Professor Katz pleads could un­
doubtedly do much to improve the situation .. But already lurking 
beneath the obstetrical dialogue are unchallenged and sometimes 
problematic decision strategies compounded by technological limita­
tions, the "technological imperative," the looming threat of malprac­
45. This occurred in North Central Bronx Hosp. v. Headley, No. 1992/85 (S. Ct., 
Special Term, Bronx Cy., N.Y., Jan. 6, 1986); Shulman interview, supra note 19. An indi­
cation of the uncertainty inherent in medical predictions and the possibly alarmist nature of 
certain predictions is that this woman had a vaginal birth in which she and the baby were 
fine, id., as did the woman in In re Baby Jeffries, No. 14004 (Probate Ct., Jackson Cy., 
Mich., May 24, 1982). Mrs. Jefferson, in Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. 
Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981), likewise gave birth vaginally. See Annas, Forced 
Cesareans: The Most Unkindest Cut of All, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1982, at 16. 
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tice liability, and numerous but often unexplored value judgments and 
potential conflicts. Already, the woman is in an extraordinarily vul­
nerable position, given her concern and anxiety for her baby's welfare. 
If we add to all this doctors' emerging ability to override treatment 
refusals they view as risky or unwise, Professor Katz's vision of shared 
decisionmaking fades into the realm of imaginary obstetrical en­
counters. Except when the doctor's recommendation is really op­
tional, the woman's choices may soon be reduced to gracefully 
submitting to the medical recommendation, resulting in the appear­
ance of informed consent. If she is compelled to submit, there is not 
eyen this comforting fiction. Hence, in obstetrics, informed consent 
niay soon pass from being a necessary illusion to an illusion that is not 
necessary at all. 
